The functional level At the functional level, these models e. These relations may represent a one-to-one correspondence of an image with an external object, or they could be preserved in the sense that the image has a functional representation that is closer to the object, say a square, than to other objects, say a rectangle.
Shepard argues that images bear the second relation, or second-order isomorphism, to percepts, rather than the first, first-order isomorphism. This view implies that the process of mental rotation of a rigid object should resemble that of perceiving a rotating object in the world. After the offset of the letter, subjects were to indicate whether the letter was the same as the target letter. Shepard and his associates hypothesized that if imagery bore a second-order isomorphism to perception, the time to respond would increase as a function of the angular separation from the upright.
Their classical results corresponded to this expectation. Indeed, these potential confounds plague much of the research on imagery, and they must be taken seriously. There are other reasons to heed them. As already noted, an alternative explanation of imagery is that the concepts and relations supposedly encoded in imagery are more parsimoniously explained as prepositional in nature Anderson, ; Pylyshyn, Indeed, Pylyshyn argued that true imagery should be "cognitively impenetrable.
Because I will contend that language plays a very important role in imagery, it is important to address these possible confounds. We begin with the possibility of subvocalization. Subvocalization, like overt vocalization, should increase the likelihood of prepositional encoding or the reliance on a form of interlingua.
Two recent approaches are relevant. Both of them adopt the strategy of testing domains that are difficult to describe in words, namely odors and timbre. Lyman and McDaniel obtained similarity judgments of ten perceived sniffed odors and the same odors imagined from odor names. The dimensions of odors are notoriously difficult to describe verbally. After obtaining all possible paired comparisons of odor-odor, odor-image odor, image odor-odor, image odor-image odor, with the orders of presentation counterbalanced over the subjects, Lyman and McDaniel obtained a multidimensional scaling solution.
The locations of the imagined odors in two-dimensional space were close to those of the perceived odors for nine of the ten odors. The exception, chocolate, showed an unexplained divergence. In brief, then, judgments of the similarity of imagined and perceived odors tended to support a lightly qualified form of imaginal-perceptual parallelism.
The other approach uses auditory stimuli. Adapting the methodology of Posner, Boies, Eichelman, and Taylor to audition, Crowder worked with judgments of pitch identity when tones were played by different instruments and therefore had different timbres and when the tones were imagined as being played on different instruments. He demonstrated preexperimentally that timbre matches facilitated pitch judgments.
The regular experimental task was to indicate whether two tones had the same or different pitch when the tones had the same or different timbre. Timbre distinctions, the supposedly irrelevant variable, also are difficult to capture verbally. In the imagery condition, subjects were given the name of an instrument guitar, trumpet, or flute. They then heard a sine wave tone and were to imagine that pitch played by the cited instrument. In both the heard and imagined conditions, timbre matches facilitated detection of pitch identity, relative to timbre mismatches.
Thus, this paradigm also delivered evidence of imaginal-perceptual parallelism. Not so in another variation of the paradigm. Perhaps subjects have difficulty imagining dynamic characteristics of sound, even though they are able to imagine more static components. Surprenant pursued this possibility, using vowels and stop consonants as her stimuli. Her methodology was similar to that used by Crowder and Pitt and Crowder , except that, across several experiments, she counterbalanced the task used as the basis for judgments and as the irrelevant dimension. Hence, subjects had to judge whether one stimulus was the same as a second one, when the stimuli assumed two levels on the relevant dimension and two on the irrelevant dimension.
Subjects were told to ignore the irrelevant dimension. Surprenant used two dimensions, pitch high or low and letter identity stop consonants or vowels. The vowels had longer steady states than did the stop consonants, which were more dynamic. In the perception conditions, judgments were faster when the sounds matched on both physical dimensions than when they did not.
The same was true for judgments involving imagined vowels, but not for imagined stop consonants. Subsequent clarifying experiments targeted the steady-state versus dynamic nature of the sounds as the basis for the different results. Apparently, static sounds are relatively easy to imagine, whereas dynamic sounds are not, probably because of incompatibility between the rapid time changes of dynamic sounds and the slower pace of imaginal processes.
Differences among the materials used in these two approaches are difficult to ensnare verbally, and they certainly defy the kind of rapid compression and translation into a verbal format that would be demanded by a subvocalization explanation. The fact that subvocalization does not hold sway with these experiments does not invalidate its potency with more readily nameable stimuli, but the evidence markedly weakens arguments for subvocalization, per se, as an omnibus explanation for imaginal results.
What about tacit knowledge? The tacit-knowledge contention holds that the stimuli evoke general knowledge about the world e. According to this explanation, the results described above may not entail essential relations between imagery and perception, but, rather, they may reflect general knowledge about the world. But do images convey general knowledge about the world, as the tacit perspective maintains?
The answer is clearly yes. For example, in one experiment, I Intons-Peterson, showed college students pairs of sounds, such as popcorn popping, whisper. Their task was to mentally adjust one sound to match the loudness of the other. No mention was made of the use of imagery to this control group. Another imagery group was asked to imagine the referents of the phrases and to mentally adjust one auditory image to match the "loudness" of the other auditory image. In general, the greater the difference in loudness, as judged by a separate standardization group, the longer it took to achieve a match.
Parenthetically, I note that this experiment yielded an unexpected result: Many subjects said that they had to visualize the image before they could "hear" it. Thus, they "saw" popcorn popping before they could "hear" the pops. No such claims were made by the control subjects, even though they were recruited from the same population and presumably had comparable experiences.
In summary, tacit knowledge does not appear to explain differences between imaginal and control performance. The balls were described as having the same 3-inch diameter, but they varied in supposed weight from a 3-ounce balloon to a 3-pound rubber ball to a pound cannon ball. On the one hand, if images contain or recruit information about the real world, we would expect mental travel times to increase with the supposed weight of the ball even though the distance mentally traveled remained constant.
On the other hand, if images do not carry such additional information, the mental travel times should be independent of the hypothetical weight of the objects. The data were clear: Hypothetically heavy objects took longer to transport mentally than did hypothetically lighter ones. Furthermore, mental travel times were systematically longer when subjects memorized the map before mental travel and then had to traverse the remembered mental map than when they had the map before them as they performed the mental travel.
These results imply that images may recruit real-world knowledge, either implicitly or explicitly. This knowledge, however, does not necessarily produce performance that mirrors perceptual counterparts, as is assumed by the tacit or demand characteristics argument for explaining imaginal-perceptual similarity.
Kosslyn proposed that images occur in a visual "buffer," akin to what might be presented on a television screen. The buffer has an arraytype format with coordinates. These coordinates make it possible to assemble parts into a whole. They index geometric properties about the image, including its spatial extent. These assumptions led to experiments on visual scanning e. After learning the map, the subjects heard the names of two landmarks. They were to imagine starting at the first-named landmark and then to scan in a direct line to the second. Upon arrival at the second, they pressed a button.
The scanning times were directly related to the length of the distances. When subjects received the same training, but were not told to scan mentally, their response times were flat, rather than showing the increase with distance exhibited by the group receiving the imaginal scanning instructions. These results suggest that mental scanning has spatial characteristics similar to those expected when we track an actual moving object, but they do not speak to the presence or absence of either a visual buffer or even of a firstorder isomorphism between imagery and perception.
The interactive level The relation between imagery and perception can be even more tightly construed. For example, Farah , Finke , and Weber and Brown have proposed that the two use the same neural pathways. Finke suggests that the common use of pathways occurs not at the sensory level but at higher perceptual levels. These views predict a closer perceptual-imaginal parallelism than was observed in the studies already reported. Some similar messages come from recent explorations of cerebral functioning.
In the following, I consider results with normal, intact adults because this work addresses more directly the issues being presented in this chapter than do studies of brain-damaged individuals. Goldenberg, Podreka, Steiner, and Willmes auditorily presented lists of meaningless, abstract, or concrete words to their subjects, followed by a recognition test.
Half of the subjects hearing concrete words were told to image the references; the other half received no such instructions. During the test list, subjects were to flash a lamp held in one hand if they thought a test item had appeared on the previous list.
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Regional cerebral blood flow was measured during rest and during the experimental procedures. Imagined concrete words were recognized significantly more often than words of any of the other conditions. Concrete words without imagery instructions, abstract words, and meaningless ones were recognized at about the same lower rate.
Meaningless words were falsely recognized reliably more often than imagined concrete words. No other differences occurred in the recognition task. Next, consider the cerebral blood-flow measures. Smallest space analyses used to study the pattern of correlations among regions as functions of the various word conditions showed that the left hemisphere is predominantly engaged in the processing of verbally elicited mental images. However, regardless of whether imagery was used intentionally or not, the imagery system was composed of regions of both hemispheres.
The explicit instruction to use imagery led to a marked leftward shift of hemispheric activity but at the same time the functional system comprised more right hemispheric regions than without an imagery instruction. The difference in hemispheric asymmetries is thus to be attributed to different modes of interhemispheric collaboration.
Possibly, these modes are determined by the intentional control of visual imagery or by the amount of attention paid to mental images rather than by visual imagery per se. We found the imagery system to be composed of regions of the medial occipital and inferior temporal lobe. Goldenberg et al, , p. Farah, Weisberg, Monheit, and Peronnet used event-related potentials ERPs, with 16 recording sites instead of cerebral blood flow to track imagerelated cerebral activity.
Subjects read either concrete and abstract words or they read and generated images of concrete words. They reported that waveforms for the various conditions were quite similar for the first ms and then began to diverge, with the imagery condition showing more positivity than the no-image baseline condition, particularly in the left occipital and posterior temporal areas. Similar results emerged in a study with 22 placements when the subjects listened to spoken words.
Farah et al. The latter conclusion does not necessarily follow if we allow cognitive penetration in imagery. The number of subjects tested per condition tended to be quite small in these studies of cerebral responses to imagery situations, another reason for caution in interpreting the results. It is not clear whether these changes reflect differences inherit in imaginal processing or additional attention and elaboration? This latter point could be addressed by studies of imagined abstract words, which, as far as I found, have not been reported.
The fact that reading plus imagining concrete words produced different patterns than reading the words and the auditory counterpart delivers the additional suggestion that perception and imagery do not necessarily induce parallel cerebral events. Another indication of caution for the interactive view of imagery and perception is that the presentation of a visual prime that either matched or did not match an image constructed from four directional sentences Intons-Peterson, was not incorporated into the image, as would be expected if imagery were tightly coupled to perception.
This experiment is considered in more detail in a later section. My goal in this section of the chapter was to examine how the two historical routes have fared, the insights into the imagery process they now afford, and to explore the intersection of the two routes or lines of imagery research.
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These traditional spotlights on imagery are successful in some respects and not in others. Within the verbal-learning approach, for example, the dual-code or modality-specific model does not handle relational effects well, even though such effects have a significant bearing on the imageability of materials and on the retention of the items e. The model does not encompass the kinds of mental manipulations that dominate research in the other tradition. Most important, it may not invoke imaginal processing. Nevertheless, a satisfactory model of imagery demands both verbal and spatial approaches to encompass available data.
In the rest of the chapter I will develop the motivation for the amalgamation of the two perspectives, including recent research indicating that a even a highly visual task such as imaginal subtraction is largely determined by linguistic attributes such as nameability, b the strategies employed in imaginal classification differ when linguistic and perceptual components are manipulated, and c neuropsychological evidence implicates linguistic and spatial processes of both hemispheres of the brain.
That is, when a memory has marked and obvious sensory-perceptual features and spatial extent, we are likely to label the introspective experience as that of having an image. The sensory-perceptual and spatial features constitute the signature of what we call an image. The sensory-perceptual-type of image identifies the predominant type of sensory processing. Most of the time, the experience involves a spatial extent of the concomitants of visual processing and is called a "visual image.
The hallmarks of an image are, therefore, that of a memory—the experience of an event after its physical offset—and that the memory contains both sensory-perceptual and, in the case of visual and tactile images, at least, spatial features. By contrast, nonimaginal memories would not be introspectively described as ones we could "almost see," "almost hear," "almost feel," and so forth. These memories, those labeled as imaginal or as nonimaginal, are retrieved from long-term memory. They may be initiated by sensory or perceptual experiences, or by linguistic input.
To repeat, a memory labeled as imaginal may be initiated by either a sensoryperceptual event or information retrieved from long-term memory. I assume further that, as with other memories, the information retrieved will consist of cues or features central to the concept represented by the memory. Thus, when retrieving a memory of a dog, the canonical features will include four legs, fur, and so forth.
Recruitment of these essential or canonical features will, in turn, tend to activate other features associated with them. Hence, if fur is activated, color, coarseness, and other features of fur also may be activated. These ancillary or extra features embellish the canonical image and may influence subsequent imaginal processing.
Thus, I construe the initial representation as consisting of a canonical form of information plus ancillary information. The retrieved representation must contain sufficient sensory-perceptual and spatial elements to exceed a threshold for classifying the resultant as an image. This threshold will differ from person to person, a situation that produces individual differences in claims to experience or to not experience imagery.
The search conducted to retrieve information from long-term memory is guided primarily by the propositions of the conceptual structures underlying verbal specification of the task. Once in working memory, the array may be combined, manipulated, compared, and so forth. As Glasgow and Conklin , p. In particular, it is concerned with the reconstruction of image representations to facilitate the retrieval of information that was not explicitly stored in long-term memory.
The image representations generated to retrieve this information may correspond to real physical scenes or to abstract concepts that are manipulated in ways similar to visual forms. Thus, they note, the knowledge representation scheme partitions computational imagery into visual and spatial reasoning, each with its own independent mode of representation. The visual component addresses the appearance of an image, what it looks like.
The spatial component locates the imaged object in space, where it is relative to its context or surround. Because each of the representations is derived from long-term memory, the model also provides for such a component. In their model, Glasgow and Conklin depict the spatial representation of an image as a symbolic array that preserves its spatial and topological properties. Visual representation is depicted by occupancy of the cells of the array, an occupancy array. Their knowledge-representation scheme for computational imagery is based on formal array theory More, The connectionist instantiation could be simplified by treating representations retrieved from long-term memory and perceptual events as input or expanded by including the search and extraction of meaning from these inputs as an early hidden layer.
Linguistic aspects, at various levels, may affect imaginal processing.
Clearly, instructions or intentions to access images of particular items are likely to be verbally guided see Denis, this volume. Here, the linguistic components may define the content of the concept being instantiated in the image. Ancillary features activated as part of the image-generation process also may have semantic effects.
Instructions to imagine a dormant purple poodle surely elicit an image different from that of instructions to imagine a dancing green Saint Bernard. Linguistic contributions to imagery may be at various levels, from the language used to describe the task, to linguistic materials intended to manipulate the likelihood that images will be generated as through the use of items rated as concrete or abstract, or as easy to imagine rather than hard to imagine.
Imagery also may be affected by naming, by either the experimenter or by the subject. As an example of the latter, consider Carmichael, Hogan, and Walter's famous work in which the label given to an ambiguous object biased drawings made later by the subjects. They also may interfere with image generation, as when the verbal information is at odds with the image. Finally, it is possible that linguistic information, even at an early stage, such as the initial acquisition of an image, may interfere with image generation by limiting the resources available to the subject.
This view is diametrically opposed to that of Pylyshyn , who argued that images should be cognitively impenetrable knowledge-independent if we are to distinguish them from propositions. This controversy has been phrased as a question of whether imaginal representation is analogical or propositional. In fact, the distinction may be more apparent than real, for propositionalists e. Moreover, a propositional view cannot readily explain figures that emerge from novel construction e. In contrast, I propose that cognitive penetrability, in the sense of linguistic features, contributes substantially and integrally to imagery.
It is the integrality of linguistic features to image construction and manipulation that distinguishes my framework from Paivio's , model. I believe that most imaginal memories draw upon linguistic elements at some stage, hence the label "knowledge-weighted. These relations flow quite seamlessly from the knowledge-weighted model, for we would expect images of familiar objects or tasks to elicit a richer, more elaborated set of ancillary cues than images of less familiar objects and tasks.
The next section of the chapter examines some key assumptions of the framework, such as support for the contentions that images have sensory, perceptual, and spatial features, and that they are sensitive to linguistic influence from the phonological to semantic levels. Obviously, the hypothesized relation predicts the co-occurrence of differential sensory-perceptual recruitment and indices of imagery. Particularly compelling are the recent neuropsychological studies e.
These patterns differ from those induced by exposure to concrete words without instructions to imagine the referents, and to abstract and meaningless words, conditions that are less likely to induce imagery. At a behavioral level, Segal and Fusella reported that the presentation of a physical auditory stimulus while subjects were imagining a visual one or vice versa interfered with detection of a probe compared to a control condition in which only a single modality of presentation was tested.
Segal and Fusella did not consider the possibility that same modality imagery could facilitate detection of the probe if the two were compatible. Hence, Peterson and Graham pursued this possibility, in addition to repeating Segal and Fusella's crossmodality manipulations.
They obtained same-modality facilitation and crossmodality interference when one sensory modality was imaginal and the other modality was manipulated physically. Clearly, images are sensation-modality penetrable. What about more perceptual concomitants of imagery? For example, do images show such perceptual effects as reconstruals of ambiguous figures? Do images reflect the goodness of their perceptually initiating figures and the component parts of these figures? These questions define the next section. Perceptual Features Classical ambiguous figures, such as Jastrow's duck-rabbit, offer another medium for showcasing the effects of perception and language on imagery.
If imagery parallels perception, we would expect subjects to be able mentally to reconstrue such figures. Note that this type of experimentation addresses only canonical features because, in the imaginal condition, subjects are shown the entire perceptual figure and asked to imagine it later. It also addresses the issue of parallels between imagery and perception. In , Chambers and Reisberg startled imagery researchers including themselves when they found that their subjects could not identify a second appearance of traditionally ambiguous forms when the forms were imagined.
One possibility was that not enough information was given to the subjects about possible changes. For example, Hyman and Neisser ; Hyman, gave both abstract and conceptual cues about what to examine. The abstract cue was "[c]onsider the front of the thing you were seeing as the back of something else," and the conceptual cue was "[c]onsider the front of the head of the animal you just reported as the back of the head of some other animal.
These data suggest that subjects may be able to reverse imaginal ambiguous stimuli if they receive explicit hints about "viewing" their images. Language also may establish expectancies. This research with a rotated image of the state of Texas indicates that knowledge-related expectations may determine whether subjects are able to detect a particular shape in their image.
These kinds of perceptual expectations guidance may arise from such subtle cues as presentations of other figures with the same or different orientations. For example, M. Peterson describes three types of perceptual reinterpretations: First, there are reversals that entail a reference-frame realignment. Second, there are reversals that entail a reconstrual of the parts of the figure, but no or little reference-frame alignment.. Third, there are reversals that entail a redetermination of figure and ground relationships and hence, a repartitioning of the shape's contour.
In figure-ground reversals, the part structure of the figure changes from one minute to the next. With the Necker cube, the reversal occurs as the assignment of front and back switches. With the Mach book, top and bottom realignments switch. The snail-elephant and the wife-mother-in-law figures on the second row involve a reinterpretation or reconstrual of the parts. Little or no change of reference frame is required. The third row depicts figures requiring both reconstrual and reference-frame realignment. Consider the duck-rabbit. The duck's bill becomes the ears of the rabbit, and the front of the duck's head is reinterpreted as the back of the rabbit's head.
The top vertical orientation remains the same for both interpretations. The middle figure in Row 3, the goosehawk, requires the same reinterpretations. The third figure in Row 3, the chef- Reference frame alignments Mach book Necker cube Part reconstruals Wife-mother-in-law Snail-elephant Part reconstruals with some reference frame alignments Duck-rabbit Goose-hawk Figure-ground alternation Rubin vase faces Figure 2.
Some ambiguous figures and the ways they reverse. Finally, figure-ground reversals, as in the Rubin vase-faces figure shown at the bottom of Figure 2. These ideas could explain the Reisberg-Chambers' Texas map experiment in the following way. The likelihood of correctly rotating and identifying a shape varies as a function of the angular disparity between the typical orientation of a shape and its orientation at presentation.
The assumption here is, of course, that naming latency and mental rotation involve similar processes, processes that underlie the recognition of disoriented shapes. Another explanation is that subjects may develop expectations for referenceframe reversals and reconstruals. These expectations then may minimize the likelihood of correctly identifying a reinterpretation of the image. Specifically, M. Peterson and her colleagues ; Peterson et al.
Chambers and Reisberg used the Necker cube, the Mach book, and the Rubin figure-ground stimuli as demonstration figures. The Necker cube and the Mach book involved reference-frame realignments, and the third entailed a figure-ground redetermination in contradistinction to the reconstrual and reference-frame realignments characteristic of the target figure, the duck-rabbit. To test this possibility, M. Peterson ; Peterson et al. Two other demonstration figures were taken from the ChambersReisberg studies: the chef-dog and the Rubin figure-ground.
The chef-dog involves both a reference-frame realignment and a part reconstrual. Hence, it might induce some successful reversal strategies, but fewer than the goose-hawk figure. Even fewer successful reversal strategies for the duck-rabbit would be induced by the figure-ground reversal, for its reversal follows quite different principles than does the duck-rabbit reversal. The fourth condition was a nodemonstration figure control. Before any hints were given, subjects successfully reinterpreted the duckrabbit figure following the goose-hawk 35 percent of the time.
They did so 10 percent of the time after chef-dog, 6 percent after figure-ground, and 10 percent after no-demonstration figure. Obviously, the hypotheses of M. Peterson and her colleagues Peterson, ; Peterson et al.
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The reasons for these different results are not clear, but they suggest occasional nonzero base rates for reversals of imaginally construed ambiguous figures. Even with nonzero base rates, the reversal of these mentally constructed figures is far below the near universal reversal of their perceived counterparts. Once again, perception and imagery are related, but not fully parallel. Could this lask of parallelism be language-induced? Implicit language effects in the work by Hyman , Hyman and Neisser , and M. This possibility was vitiated by M. Peterson's demonstration that subjects rarely gave the name of the reversal when cued with the name of the other form of the figure.
The research with ambiguous figures suggests that subjects are able to reconstrue the figures imaginally, but only when their interpretation, understanding, or expectation is for the appropriate reference frame only when the image is compatible with language-guided knowledge of the world. Reisberg and Logie take a different perspective as they argue that reference frames interpretations limit what can be learned from images.
The limitations can be overcome, Reisberg and Logie contend, by cooperation with motor patterns efferent input to the sensory affective mode. In this latter research, subjects heard or imagined rapid repetitions of a word such as stress. In the perceptual condition, the subjects perceived the customary reversals from stress to dress and back again.
So did subjects who imagined repeating the word stress, as long as their subvocalization was not suppressed by chewing or clamping their mouths shut. When their subvocalization was suppressed, the imaginal subjects did not detect the transformation. Reisberg and Logie propose that the "inner voice" of subvocalization provides motoric efferent input to guide the afferent input of the "inner ear," and that a similar mechanism may underlie one form of visual imagery, notably spatial imagery.
To use their picturesque language, in spatial imagery, the "inner scribe" may guide the "inner eye. They contend that spatial-motoric imagery is dynamic, whereas the other form of visual imagery is static. Anderson and Helstrup's failure to find that externalization of visual images by drawing facilitated performance more than simply imagining compilations of objects is somewhat embarrassing to this view, but Anderson and Helstrup's creative-manipulation task may have invoked so many motoric components that the addition of drawing had little effect.
As Reisberg and Logie suggest, neuropsychological evidence may divulge cortical patterns that differentiate perceptual and imaginal processing. This research indicated that, with a mental-rotation task, neural activity in the parietal cortex preceded voluntary movement. In fact, the neural activity corresponded to the direction of movement needed to align the cue. Apparently, nonhumans display preparatory parietal activity suggestive of mental imagery before they respond. The exact dependencies between the preparatory neural events and the response remain a mystery.
Perception has other characteristics that might be manifested in imagery if imagery depends on perception. One characteristic is "judged goodness. If higher-order perception affects imagery, imaginally constructed representations of perceived patterns should show the same pattern. These predictions were extended to imagery by Beverly Roskos-Ewoldsen as part of her exploration of the detection of imaginal emergent patterns.
She first taught her subjects the line-number pairs of lines drawn between dots of a 9-dot array see top of Fig. Then subjects learned one 3-line pattern, followed by a second 3-line pattern by constructing the patterns from their line numbers. The perception group drew the lines on a 9-dot array; the imagery subjects imagined them. Then one of three 3-line test probes was presented. The probes tested an old part, an emergent part constructed from the combined 6-line pattern , or a noncomponent part. Subjects had to ascertain whether the probe came from the total pattern.
Prior to experimentation, all of the 3-line patterns and the composite 6-line patterns had been rated independently for goodness. These ratings were used to manipulate goodness of the component parts and of the overall 6-line pattern. Samples of Roskos-Ewoldsen's initial array, a 6-line part, two 3-line parts, and test probes. Thus, the detection of emergent parts should be impeded by the goodness of the overall pattern but facilitated by the goodness of the two parts.
Roskos-Ewoldsen used two measures, recognition accuracy and correct response times. Although some conditions did not show differences as functions of goodness taken collectively, her results supported the predictions, with somewhat more support from the imagers than from the drawers. Most of Reed and Johnsen's patterns would have been judged as good. These same parsing difficulties may have been responsible for the slower mental rotation times for Pylyshyn's figures rated low in goodness using Palmer's , criteria compared to those rated higher in goodness.
This research on what I consider the acquisition of a canonical image documents the effects of perceptual judgments of goodness. As hypothesized, perceptual origins influence imagery, although the evidence suggests that perceptual and imaginal performance occasionally differs. Neither parallel nor perpendicular, the similarity of imaginal and perceptual performance is often oblique and variable. Spatial Extent I suggest that, in addition to their sensory and perceptual features, memories called "images" also depict spatial extent. Three lines of research converge on this conclusion: work with the congenitally blind, imaginal-scanning results, and demonstrations of the cerebral distribution of imaginal processing.
The congenitally blind are able to perform imaginal tasks usually considered to be visual in nature see Ernest, , for a review. Presumably, if imagery relies exclusively on sensory underpinnings, individuals with sensory deficits should be unable to perform imaginal tasks. This is not the case. The book includes contributions from proponents of different views: Robert Logie discusses the existence of three different components that control temporary verbal storage, temporary visuo-spatial storage, and the central coordination of both processing and storage, including the retrieval of information from long-term memory; Ellen Stoltzfus, Lynn Hasher, and Rose Zacks focus on the inhibitory processes that control the entrance of information into working memory and update the contents by deleting information that is no longer relevant to the task at hand; and Randall Engle argues that individual differences in working memory are tantamount to differences in the attentional resources needed to retrieve information from memory, and that these lead to differences in the ability to inhibit or suppress irrelevant information.
Finally, editor John Richardson identifies the key issues that have divided researchers in this field and gives an integrated account of what has been discovered about working memory. As interest in working memory is increasing at a rapid pace, an open discussion of the centralissues involved is both useful and timely. This work serves this purpose for cognitive psychologists and their students. Current Status of the Inhibitory View. Agam, Y. Reduced cognitive control of response inhibition by the anterior cingulate cortex in autism spectrum disorders.
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Working memory and writing: Model evolution and research assessment
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